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Jewish Identity and Judging:                          
Seymour Simon of Illinois 
Jack M. Beermann* 
INTRODUCTION 
Seymour Simon was a politician-turned judge who consistently 
turned away from power in favor of principle.  Justice Simon had a long 
career in public service, having served in the military and in all three 
branches of government: as an attorney in the U.S. Department of 
Justice, as an alderman in the City of Chicago, and as judge of the 
Illinois Appellate Court and justice of the Illinois Supreme Court.  He 
was a brilliant man who had one guiding principle: justice under the 
law.  He did not compromise his principles—which as a judge meant he 
was the hardest working member of his court—probably filing more 
dissenting and concurring opinions than all the other justices combined 
during his time on the Illinois Supreme Court.   
Justice Simon’s Jewishness was an important part of his identity 
throughout his life, including his political and judicial career.  An Irish-
run political machine dominated Chicago politics in the mid-twentieth 
century, but Jews were elected as representatives of heavily Jewish 
neighborhoods.1  Justice Simon was active in his synagogue and in any 
Jewish civic organization that asked.  There is no question that his 
Jewish identity worked hand in hand with his commitment to social 
justice as both a politician and judge.  His appearance and bearing 
 
* Professor of Law and Harry Elwood Warren Scholar, Boston University School of Law.  An 
earlier version of this Article was presented at the conference on “Jewish Justices: A Comparative 
Exploration of Jewish Identity to Judging” at Tel Aviv Law School, Tel Aviv, Israel, on 
December 7, 2010.  Thanks to Miles Beermann, Pnina Lahav, and John Simon (Justice Simon’s 
son) for comments on an earlier draft of this Article, and special thanks to John Simon and Lester 
Munson, ESPN writer who worked with Justice Simon on his uncompleted memoirs, for 
generously discussing Justice Simon’s life and career with me. 
1. Jews also held other prominent political positions during this time.  Illinois elected a Jewish 
governor, Henry Horner, who served from 1933 to 1940.  Another Jew, Samuel Shapiro, was 
elected Lieutenant Governor in 1960 and 1964, and served as Governor from 1968 to 1969 when 
Governor Otto Kerner resigned to become a federal judge.  Kerner resigned his judgeship in 1974 
after being convicted for taking bribes while governor.  Shapiro ran for governor but was defeated 
by Republican Richard Ogilvie.  In 2011, Rahm Emanuel was elected as the first Jewish mayor of 
Chicago. 
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brought to mind an image of the righteous Jew pointing the accusatory 
finger at those who failed to live up to community standards and 
showering unconditional affection and loyalty on those who did.   
Justice Simon made many more friends than enemies during his 
career.  As Ward Committeeman, he held open office hours during 
which constituents would line up with requests and concerns.  No 
matter the problem or the petitioner’s social standing, Justice Simon 
always did whatever he could to assist constituents in need.  His 
devotion to the problems of every man carried over to his views as a 
judge, where he fulfilled the basic judicial obligation to dispense justice 
without regard to persons. 
Justice Simon made many contributions to Illinois law, some of 
which paved the way for legal reforms at the national level.  This 
Article, after providing background on Justice Simon’s life, turns to one 
area of law that was often the focus of Justice Simon’s work: the death 
penalty.  While on the Supreme Court, Justice Simon dissented in every 
case in which the sentence of death was affirmed by the court, on the 
basis that this ultimate punishment could not be fairly administered.  
Although he failed to convince his colleagues to strike down the death 
penalty, his views ultimately triumphed.  In 2003, in light of numerous 
exonerations of convicted criminals, Illinois Governor Ryan commuted 
all death sentences in the state to life imprisonment.  Soon after, the 
Illinois Legislature passed a bill abolishing the death penalty.   
This Article also examines In re Loss, a Supreme Court decision to 
deny a license to practice law to a man who had previously been a 
heroin addict and a petty criminal.  This case led to Justice Simon’s 
departure from the Illinois Supreme Court.  Justice Simon, in dissent, 
accused his colleagues of impropriety in the handling of the case, and 
his relationship with those colleagues was fatally fractured.  A short 
time after In re Loss and three years before the expiration of his term, 
Justice Simon resigned from the Illinois Supreme Court, thus ending the 
judicial career of one of the great jurists of the Illinois courts.  Justice 
Simon then returned to private practice, but remained active in political 
and civic causes until his death in 2006 at the age of 91. 
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I. SEYMOUR SIMON: THE MAN AND POLITICIAN2 
Seymour Simon was raised in the Albany Park neighborhood of 
Chicago.  This neighborhood has long been home to immigrants and 
was predominantly Jewish between the 1910s and 1950s.3  Justice 
Simon attended local public schools, including Roosevelt High School, 
which at the time had a largely Jewish population.  He was a member of 
a Reform synagogue, Temple Beth Israel of Albany Park, which has 
since moved to Skokie, Illinois.  The synagogue apparently had a left-
wing orientation.4  Interestingly, Temple Beth Israel was also reportedly 
the synagogue of future Israeli Supreme Court Justice Shimon Agranat 
(although it is unknown whether Justices Simon and Agranat ever 
met).5  Justice Simon was an active member and supporter of the 
synagogue and developed a close personal relationship with its rabbi.  
He also supported other synagogues and Jewish organizations 
regardless of whether they were affiliated with the reform, conservative, 
or orthodox communities.  He lent his name and his support to virtually 
every Jewish civic organization that asked. 
Justice Simon graduated first in his class from Northwestern 
University School of Law in 1938.  He had a brilliant mind with a 
 
2. The information on Justice Simon’s life and career, unless noted otherwise, is drawn 
primarily from four sources: telephone conversations with John Simon, Justice Simon’s son; a 
conversation with Lester Munson, an ESPN writer who worked with Justice Simon on his 
uncompleted memoirs; an interview of Justice Simon reported in MILTON RAKOVE, WE DON’T 
WANT NOBODY NOBODY SENT: AN ORAL HISTORY OF THE DALEY YEARS 331–45 (1979); and 
my personal recollections. 
3. Chicago is a notoriously segregated city, although perhaps less so now than in the early- to 
mid-twentieth century.  For example, in 1930, the Albany Park neighborhood was 99.9 percent 
white, while in 1960 it was 99.6 percent white (and none of the other 0.4 percent of the residents 
was black).  See Albany Park, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CHI., http://www.encyclopedia.chicagohistory. 
org/pages/36.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2013).  Today, Albany Park has an enormously diverse 
immigrant population with Mexicans being the largest single group.  Id. 
4. Evidence of the synagogue’s left-wing orientation includes the fact that it co-sponsors a 
lecture named in honor of one of Justice Simon’s rabbis together with the Labor Zionists of 
America organization, a socialist-Zionist group.  See Study, TEMPLE BETH ISRAEL, http://www. 
tbiskokie.org/study.cfm (describing the purpose of the lecture as inviting lecturer “to speak on 
issues of social, political and religious justice, the modern state of Israel, and the ways in which 
Progressive Jews interact with one another”). 
5. See IRVING CUTLER, THE JEWS OF CHICAGO: FROM SHTETL TO SUBURB 238 (1996) 
(“Shimon Agranat, one of its members, later became one of the Chief Justices of Israel, and 
another member, Seymour Simon, became a Justice of the Illinois Supreme Court.”).  Justice 
Agranat attended the Von Humboldt Public Elementary School and Tuley Public High School, 
which means he was probably living in the Humboldt Park neighborhood, located about five 
miles south of the Albany Park neighborhood.  See PNINA LAHAV, JUDGMENT IN JERUSALEM: 
CHIEF JUSTICE AGRANAT AND THE ZIONIST CENTURY 10 (1997).  Both neighborhoods have long 
attracted immigrant populations.  Today, Humboldt Park is known as “Little Puerto Rico” due to 
the Puerto Rican origins of its largest population group. 
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scholarly orientation that was evident in his judicial writings.  After law 
school, he served in the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of 
Justice until 1942, when he began service in the Navy for the duration 
of World War II.  In 1946, he began a career in private practice that 
lasted nearly thirty years, practicing antitrust law in Chicago. 
In 1955, a decade after returning from his Navy service and while he 
continued in private practice, Justice Simon won a seat as a City of 
Chicago Alderman for the 40th Ward.6  During his service as alderman, 
Justice Simon also became the Ward Committeeman for the Democratic 
Party.  He served as an alderman from 1955–1961, when he was 
appointed to the Cook County Board to fill a “Jewish seat.”  When the 
President of the County Board became ill and was unable to run again, 
Mayor Daley and the party leadership decided to slate Seymour Simon 
for the position.  He was elected President of the Cook County Board 
and served in that role from 1962–1966.  This move by Mayor Daley 
may have been politically motivated—he was facing his only really 
tough reelection fight, and the Jewish vote substantially contributed to 
his victory.  Justice Simon also served as President of the Cook County 
Forest Preserve District during his time as County Board President and 
was a member of the Chicago Public Building Commission from 1961–
1967.  After his term as County Board President, he returned to the 
Chicago City Council after being reelected in 1967 to his old seat as 
40th Ward Alderman.  (He had retained his position as Ward 
Committeeman during his service on the County Board.)  He served in 
that role until he was elected to the Illinois Appellate Court in 1974. 
It is not obvious how remarkable Justice Simon’s political career was 
without understanding the nature of Chicago politics during this period.  
Cook County Board President is the second most powerful political 
office in the Chicago area, after Mayor of Chicago.  The reason that 
Justice Simon did not seek re-election as County Board President in 
1974 was that he lost the support of the Democratic Party machine.  The 
Democratic Party, the only party with any electoral power in Chicago, 
was run in a fashion that we call “machine politics.”  The party, headed 
by Mayor Richard J. Daley, dispensed favors, controlled the city 
government, and used the largess of government and party discipline to 
maintain power.  Abner Mikva, another Jewish-American judge from 
Chicago with a long and varied political career, reported that when he 
went to volunteer at the local Democratic party office, he was asked 
“who sent him,” to which he replied “nobody.”  This exchange led to 
 
6. “Alderman” is the title of Members of the Chicago City Council, the City’s legislative 
body.  There are fifty Wards in the City, and each elects one alderman to the City Council. 
1_BEERMANN.DOCX 4/18/2013  10:59 AM 
2013] Jewish Identity and Judging: Seymour Simon of Illinois 943 
the famous rejection of his offer on the basis that “we don’t want 
nobody nobody sent.”7 
Justice Simon lost the support of the machine because he would not 
go along with the way the machine did business.  Apparently, the last 
straw was that, as County Board President, he refused to push for a 
zoning change pressed upon him by Alderman Thomas Keane, a 
powerful and close ally of Mayor Daley.8  Keane requested that Justice 
Simon and the other Democratic members of the County Board vote in 
favor of rezoning a parcel of land north of Chicago for use as a garbage 
dump despite vehement local opposition.  Keane’s interest was that the 
lawyer for the owner (a religious order) was a political ally.  Keane 
insisted that the Democrats vote in favor of the ordinance to satisfy his 
promise to the lawyer, despite Republicans having enough votes to vote 
it down.  Justice Simon refused and Keane urged Mayor Daley to purge 
Simon from the party.9  Without Democratic Party support, Justice 
Simon knew he could not be re-elected President of the County 
Board.10  Although he gave up that position, he remarkably won back 
his seat as 40th Ward Alderman without the support of the party—a 
testament to his stellar record and reputation. 
Justice Simon’s connection to the common person and his or her 
problems was instrumental in forming his judicial persona.  His years as 
Alderman and Ward Committeeman forced him to see the world 
through the eyes of his constituents.  One of the practices of the Ward 
Committeeman was to hold “Ward Nights,” during which constituents 
would come to open office hours and seek help solving their problems.  
His concern for society was reminiscent of the empathy for which 
another Illinois politician, Abraham Lincoln, was famous.  As it was 
described to me, “Each person’s problem became Seymour’s problem.  
He extended himself for everyone.”11 
 
7. See RAKOVE, supra note 2, at 318. 
8. Keane eventually went to jail for mail fraud and conspiracy.  THOMAS J. GRADEL ET AL., 
CURING CORRUPTION IN ILLINOIS: ANTI-CORRUPTION REPORT NUMBER 1, at 14 (2009), 
available at http://www.uic.edu/depts/pols/ChicagoPolitics/Anti-corruptionReport.pdf.  This 
Report lists thirty Chicago aldermen who were convicted of corruption-related offenses between 
1973 and 2008 and two more who died after being indicted but before trial.  See id. 
9. See Trevor Jensen & Joseph Sjostrom, Seymour Simon: 1915 – 2006: An Independent 
Political Mind Chicagoan Was True to His Beliefs in a Career in Politics and Law that Spanned 
Nearly 70 Years, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 27, 2006), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2006-09-
27/news/0609270191_1_death-penalty-illinois-supreme-court-mayor-richard-j-daley. 
10. Republican Richard Ogilvie, who had been County Sheriff (also an elected position), 
defeated the Democratic machine candidate and succeeded Justice Simon as President of the 
County Board.  Ogilvie went on to become Governor of Illinois. 
11. Telephone Interview with John Simon, Justice Seymour Simon’s son (Nov. 9–10, 2010). 
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A pair of the issues that Justice Simon addressed as County Board 
President and Alderman illustrates his constant concern for everyday 
people.  In a revenue-raising measure, pay toilets were installed at 
Chicago’s O’Hare Airport.  As County Board President, Simon led a 
successful effort to have these removed on the basis that the people 
should not have to pay a quarter to use the toilet.  Given the general 
tenor of Chicago politics at the time, this likely spoiled the sweetheart 
deal of some vendor with the contract to install and maintain the toilets.  
During his service on the City Council, an attempt to raise the rates at 
city-owned parking garages came before the Council.  The garages were 
maintained by a politically connected person, which likely meant that 
political clout and other favors were involved.  In Alderman Simon’s 
view, the garages were filthy and were not being properly maintained, 
and therefore he railed in the City Council against the effort to raise 
fees.  That very day, Alderman Simon’s car was stolen from a city 
garage.  It is unknown whether the theft was a coincidence or another 
bit of evidence of the hardball nature of Chicago politics. 
Justice Simon’s life of experience prepared him well for his service 
on the Illinois Supreme Court.  There has been recent talk about the 
relatively narrow life experiences of the sitting Justices of the U.S. 
Supreme Court.12  Until the recent appointment of Elena Kagan, all nine 
Supreme Court Justices had been federal appellate judges prior to 
serving on the nation’s highest court.  These critics would have viewed 
Justice Simon as a perfect addition to the Court, with service in the 
military, the U.S. Department of Justice, private practice, and City and 
County Governments in Illinois.  Seymour Simon’s background and 
credentials certainly contributed to his ability to humanize justice as a 
member of the Illinois Supreme Court. 
II. SEYMOUR SIMON: THE JUSTICE 
In 1974, with the backing of the Democratic Party machine, Seymour 
Simon ran for and was elected to the Illinois Appellate Court.13  In 
 
12. See, e.g., Comments of Nina Totenberg, Jim Newton & Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., 
Fixing Justice, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, http://www.brennancenter.org/content/pages/ 
fixing_justice (last visited Jan. 30, 2013) (suggesting that the President add diversity of 
background and experience to Supreme Court). 
13. In the vernacular, the Democratic Party “slated” Justice Simon for election, which, due to 
the Party’s dominance in Chicago, all but assured him election.  To get a sense of the way the 
Party controlled judicial elections, consider the following story that I was told while studying law 
in Chicago.  The Democratic Party Convention in Chicago in 1968 was the site of massive 
protests, mainly by anti-war groups and leftist opponents of U.S. government policy.  Mayor 
Daley famously ordered the police to stop the protests by shooting to kill.  Lawsuits were filed 
over the City’s refusal to grant permits for the protestors to use public facilities.  (The permit 
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Illinois, judges at all levels—trial, appellate, and supreme—are elected 
by district in partisan elections.  Once a judge is elected, he or she must 
receive sixty percent of the votes cast in periodic retention elections to 
remain on the bench.  At least once, the political machine funded an 
anti-retention campaign, but Justice Simon received sufficient votes to 
maintain his position on the Appellate Court.   
He immediately distinguished himself as a hard-working, dedicated 
member of the Appellate Court.  His opinions were always clear and 
well reasoned.  After several years on the Appellate Court, Seymour 
Simon was elected to the Supreme Court of Illinois—this time without 
the backing of the Democratic Party machine. 
In a sense, Justice Simon was banished to the courts for his political 
sins.  Due to Chicago’s changing demographics, it is unclear how long 
he could have retained his seat on the City Council after 1980, 
especially without the Democratic Party’s backing.  Any effort for City, 
County, or State office was virtually hopeless without the backing of the 
Democrats.  Justice Simon was keenly aware of the Party’s clout—
although early on he had thrived on shouting and finger-pointing in the 
City Council, over time he began to tire of the fighting and rancor.  Yet, 
the City’s loss was the legal system’s gain, as Justice Simon was 
arguably the most able and distinguished judge in Illinois during his 
time on the Appellate and Supreme Courts.  Although Justice Simon 
found his position as an appellate judge intellectually rewarding, he also 
felt somewhat isolated and lonely.  His new position contrasted starkly 
with Ward nights and City Council meetings—none of the daily contact 
with lawyers and parties equaled the closeness and camaraderie Justice 
Simon felt with his constituents.  Justice Simon once said that he wished 
someone would tell him that one of his opinions stunk just so he would 
know someone was reading them and that, if he had it to do all over 
again, he would have stuck to private practice.14  Instead, he moved up 
from the Appellate Court to the Supreme Court. 
Although much could be written about Justice Simon’s contributions 
to Illinois law, this Article focuses on two elements of his judicial 
career: his opinions concerning the death penalty, and a case involving 
the eligibility of a former heroin addict and petty criminal to become a 
lawyer in Illinois. 
 
denials were a huge mistake since the protests would have moved off the street.)  During 
negotiations to settle the lawsuits, I was told that one of the defendants’ initial offers was that the 
plaintiffs could name three candidates to be slated in the next judicial election.  This offer was not 
accepted. 
14. See RAKOVE, supra note 2, at 344. 
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A. Death Penalty 
As a justice of the Illinois Supreme Court, Seymour Simon voted 
against every death sentence that came before him.  Since appeal to the 
State Supreme Court is automatic in death penalty cases, Justice Simon 
voted against every death sentence imposed in Illinois during his years 
on the Supreme Court.  It is unknown whether his opposition to the 
death penalty predated his service on the Supreme Court.  Justice Simon 
did not sit on any death penalty case during his fourteen years on the 
Appellate Court because death penalty appeals went directly to the 
Supreme Court.  Given his generally liberal political orientation, his 
opposition to the death penalty may have been expected, but the 
consistency of his voting record and the vehemence with which he 
expressed his views in death penalty cases may have been surprising.   
A brief history of the death penalty in the United States is necessary 
to set the stage for exploring Justice Simon’s views on the death penalty 
in Illinois.  In 1972, the U.S. Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia held 
virtually all state death penalty statutes unconstitutional on procedural 
grounds.15  The Court did not categorically rule that capital punishment 
was “cruel and unusual punishment” prohibited by the Constitution, but 
rather the arbitrary manner in which it had been administered made it, 
under the circumstances, cruel and unusual.16  Almost immediately, 
thirty-five states enacted new death penalty statutes.  In 1976, the 
Supreme Court upheld some of these new statutes, but again struck 
some down as not meeting the concerns that led to its previous ruling.17 
In Illinois, the story is a bit more complicated.  Like many other 
states, the Illinois Legislature quickly passed a new statute to revamp 
the procedures for imposing the death penalty in accordance with the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Furman.  The Illinois Supreme Court, 
however, struck down the new law in 1975 on procedural and 
substantive grounds.18  The first procedural problem the Court found 
with the new statute was that it designated a three-judge panel to impose 
sentences in capital cases.  This provision, according to the Court, 
violated the autonomy of each trial judge who could not constitutionally 
 
15. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 256–57 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).  The Court as 
a whole issued only a brief per curiam opinion in Furman, leaving its reasoning to be gleaned 
from the various concurring opinions. 
16. See id. at 274 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[The principle that a State must not arbitrarily 
inflict severe punishment] derives from the notion that the State does not respect human dignity 
when, without reason, it inflicts upon some people a severe punishment that it does not inflict 
upon others.”). 
17. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 222 (1976). 
18. People ex rel. Rice v. Cunningham, 336 N.E.2d 1 (1975). 
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be required to act in concert with other trial judges.19  The second 
procedural problem the Court found was that the statute provided for 
review of death sentences by the Appellate Court—contrary to a 
provision in the Illinois Constitution of 1970 that designated the 
Supreme Court as the appellate tribunal for capital sentences.20  The 
Court also found the statute infirm on the substantive ground that its 
provision regarding mercy was too narrow because it allowed the 
sentencing body to consider only issues related to the crime, not matters 
relating to characteristics of the defendant unrelated to the crime.21  It 
also found that the mercy provision lacked sufficient guidelines.22 
Interestingly, the invalidated statute seemed to require the prosecutor 
to seek the death penalty in all cases of murder when one of a list of 
aggravating factors was present.23  In 1977, the State Legislature 
repealed this provision and amended the statute to read: “[T]he State 
may either seek a sentence of imprisonment . . . or where appropriate 
seek a sentence of death.”24  A death sentence is appropriate only where 
at least one of a number of statutory aggravating factors is found.25  
Under U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the defendant is allowed to argue 
that mitigating factors counsel against imposition of the death penalty, 
including mitigating factors not listed in the state statute.26  The state, 
however, must prove the existence of at least one statutory aggravating 
factor beyond a reasonable doubt for the death penalty to be imposed.27 
 
19. See id. at 6 (“The [death penalty statute], therefore, is constitutionally defective because 
each of the judges constituting the panel is deprived of the jurisdiction vested in him by the 1970 
Constitution.”). 
20. See id. (“The procedure for appellate review established by the statute is clearly 
unconstitutional.”). 
21. Id. 
22. See id.  (“[T]he provision is defective because it does not contain standards or guidelines 
to be considered in determining whether there are ‘compelling reasons for mercy’ and the 
imposing of a sentence other than a sentence of death.”). 
23. See 1973 Ill. Laws 2961−63 (repealed and amended by 1977 Ill. Laws 70), invalidated by 
People ex rel. Rice v. Cunningham, 336 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 1975). 
24. 1977 Ill. Laws 74. 
25. 1977 Ill. Laws 72. 
26. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978). 
27. While the U.S. Supreme Court may not have stated this rule in so many words, it appears 
to be the universal interpretation of the Court’s requirements that the death penalty determination 
be informed by the circumstances of the crime, the character and attributes of the defendant, and 
be guided by statutory aggravating factors.  See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 196–98 (1976).  
See also Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 52–53 (1986) (discussing the role of a jury in finding the 
existence of aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 602 
(2002) (“If a State makes an increase in a defendant’s authorized punishment contingent on the 
finding of a fact, that fact—no matter how the State labels it—must be found by a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”). 
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In 1979, in People ex rel. Carey v. Cousins, the Illinois Supreme 
Court upheld the death penalty statute against a challenge focusing on 
the discretion of prosecutors to seek the death penalty.28  Under Illinois 
law, the prosecutor may seek the death penalty only when one of seven 
listed aggravating factors are present.  But under the 1977 amendment, 
there are no guidelines concerning when the prosecutor should not seek 
the death penalty even when one or more aggravating factors is present.  
If the prosecutor decides not to seek the death penalty in a particular 
case, there is no possibility that the defendant will be sentenced to 
death.  The majority rejected the contention that this unbridled 
prosecutorial discretion over whether to seek the death penalty meant 
that the imposition of the death penalty in Illinois was arbitrary and 
therefore, in violation of the Eight Amendment’s prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishment.  Three of the seven justices dissented 
from this decision.  They explained their view as follows: 
In appraising the effect of the prosecutor’s discretion, it must be 
remembered that the statute confers this discretion not upon one 
individual, but upon the State’s Attorney in each of the 102 counties in 
this State.  In view of the absence of statutory directives to the 
prosecutor, each State’s Attorney is free to establish his own policy as 
to when sentencing hearings will be requested. . . .  Such unguided 
discretion will inevitably lead to an arbitrary and capricious 
application of the death penalty similar to that condemned in Furman.  
There can be no doubt that under this statute some offenders will be 
chosen as candidates for the death penalty by one prosecutor, while 
other offenders with similar qualifications will be spared . . . because 
of the uneven application of the law due to the lack of statutory 
direction to the prosecutor.  There will inevitably be cases where there 
will be no reasonable basis for the distinction between one on whom 
the penalty of death is imposed and another who is passed over.29 
Justice Simon’s election to the Illinois Supreme Court took place 
after the Cousins decision.  Although he had no record on the death 
penalty as an Appellate Court judge, he had criticized prosecutors in his 
opinions and was attacked during the campaign as soft on crime.  In 
replacing one of the members of the Cousins majority, Justice Simon 
surely thought that the vote in the next death penalty case would be 4-3 
to strike down the Illinois statute on the grounds raised in the Cousins 
 
28. People ex rel. Carey v. Cousins, 397 N.E. 2d 809, 815 (Ill. 1979). 
29. Id. at 822 (Ryan, J. dissenting).  This reasoning resonates with the theme of a widely read 
anti-death penalty book, CHARLES BLACK, JR., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF 
CAPRICE AND MISTAKE (1974).  One of Black’s themes is that caprice results from the 
prosecutor’s broad discretion in deciding whether to pursue the death penalty in a particular case.  
See id. at 15, 21, 37–44. 
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dissent. 
One case that had already been argued but not decided when Justice 
Simon joined the Supreme Court was a death penalty case, People v. 
Lewis.30  Lewis had been convicted of murder and sentenced to death.  
One of Lewis’s grounds for appeal was the same as in Cousins: the 
prosecutor’s discretion rendered the penalty too arbitrary to survive 
Eighth Amendment scrutiny.  This time, the court voted 6-1 to reject the 
challenge to the Illinois death penalty statute.31 Incredibly, the three 
justices who had dissented in Cousins continued to express the view that 
the Illinois statute was unconstitutional, but concluded that stare decisis 
required them to acquiesce in the prior majority decision upholding the 
provision.  As Chief Justice Goldenhersh explained: 
 I joined Mr. Justice Ryan in his dissent in People ex rel. Carey v. 
Cousins and for the reasons therein stated am of the opinion that the 
death penalty provisions of section 9-1 of the Criminal Code are 
unconstitutional. . . . 
 It is apparent that the General Assembly and a majority of the 
electorate of this State desire that the death penalty be available as a 
sanction in certain types of cases.  If this court were the final tribunal 
to determine the validity of the statute in its present form I would 
continue to dissent in the hope that ultimately a majority of the court 
would agree or that the General Assembly might be persuaded to 
effect the amendments which I consider necessary to render the statute 
valid. In this situation, however, the Supreme Court can grant 
certiorari and decide the questions on which this court is divided. 
Once this court has spoken, I, like any other citizen of Illinois, 
must acquiesce in its decision.  That there be a final decision on the 
issue is of great importance for the reason that there are now pending 
before this court [twenty-six] cases wherein death penalties have been 
imposed.  It is essential that the question of the validity of the statute 
be determined.  Consequently, with considerable reluctance, under the 
compulsion of People ex rel. Carey v. Cousins, I concur in the opinion 
affirming the judgment of the circuit court of Champaign County.32 
Justice Simon did not take kindly to this basis for upholding the death 
penalty.  His dissent proved to be a bad start for any hope of a collegial 
relationship with his fellow justices.  In response to his colleagues’ plea 
for stability in the law, Justice Simon bluntly stated: 
 
30. 430 N.E.2d 1346 (Ill. 1981).  It is not clear, however, whether Justice Simon’s 
membership on the court required a re-vote of the case or whether the justices simply maintained 
the votes they had cast when the case was argued before Justice Simon’s election. 
31. Id. at 1363. 
32. Id. at 1363–64 (Goldenhersh, J. concurring). 
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It would be blatant folly for this court to acquiesce in the execution of 
Cornelius Lewis without disclosing that four of the judges comprising 
the present court, either now or in the past two years, have viewed the 
death penalty statute as unconstitutional.  How much confidence can 
any member of the judiciary, any State official or any member of the 
General Assembly have that this statute will continue to be viewed as 
constitutional?33 
In addition to forcefully arguing that the death penalty as administered 
violated the Illinois Constitution, Justice Simon cited numerous 
examples in which the Illinois Supreme Court had overruled prior 
decisions, including examples of decisions overruled within a few years 
due to changes in the Court’s membership.34  That is to say, Justice 
Simon’s opinion exposed the prior dissenters’ pleas for stability in the 
law as disingenuous.   
Was there a different explanation for the switch in votes by the three 
former dissenters?  It may be that they were comfortable dissenting 
from a decision upholding the death penalty, but would never have 
struck down the death penalty statute even if they had secured a 
majority.  (This is the only explanation for Chief Justice Goldenhersh’s 
reference to the desire of the people and the General Assembly to allow 
the death penalty in Illinois.)  Justice Simon, however, raised another 
possibility.  In Twelve Executions Which Should Not Have Been, an 
article published years after he left the Court, Justice Simon speculated 
that his colleagues’ change of heart was related to the conviction of 
serial killer John Wayne Gacy.35  Gacy killed thirty-three people and 
was convicted and sentenced to death, after Cousins but before Lewis 
reached the Supreme Court.36  Perhaps no judge, especially one who 
needed to periodically win sixty percent of the vote in a retention 
election, wanted to be identified as one who helped prevent the 
execution of a monster like Gacy.   
In the article, Justice Simon also pointed out that Cornelius Lewis 
was not executed for reasons consistent with Justice Simon’s view that 
the death penalty was improperly administered in Illinois.  It turned out 
that Lewis’s court-appointed lawyer, who had not tried a criminal case 
for many years, agreed to the existence of an aggravating factor of two 
 
33. Id. at 1370 (Simon, J. dissenting). 
34. See id. at 1371–72. 
35. See Seymour Simon, Twelve Executions Which Should Not Have Been, 18 CHI. BAR 
ASS’N RECORD 24 (2004). 
36. See People v. Gacy, 468 N.E.2d 1171, 1208, 1219 (Ill. 1984) (affirming Gacy’s 1980 
conviction and sentence).  Justice Simon dissented from the imposition of the death penalty.  See 
id. at 1220 (Simon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  See generally TERRY SULLIVAN 
& PETER T. MAIKEN, KILLER CLOWN: THE JOHN WAYNE GACY MURDERS (1983). 
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prior felony convictions when one was a misdemeanor and another was 
a charge without a conviction.37  At a resentencing hearing, the jury 
decided against capital punishment.38 
In any case, Justice Simon did not limit his dissenting opinion in 
Lewis to an explication of the merits of the constitutional challenge to 
the Illinois statute and criticism of his colleagues for hiding behind stare 
decisis in voting to uphold the death sentence.  Justice Simon also 
declared that the former dissenters’ explanation in Cousins for why the 
Illinois statute violates the Illinois Constitution “cannot be surpassed.”39  
In fact, he reprinted that portion of the Cousins opinion as an appendix 
to his dissent in Lewis—a clear message of his righteous indignation for 
the judges’ flip-flop.  (Again, not a good start in terms of collegial 
relations with the rest of the court.) 
 
*** 
I was studying law at the University of Chicago when the Illinois 
Supreme Court handed down its decision in Lewis.  It was during this 
period that I became personally acquainted with Justice Simon.  I had 
several conversations with him about legal issues, and in one such 
conversation, he asked me what I thought of the Lewis Court’s 
application of stare decisis.  In turn, I offered to ask Professor Edward 
Levi for his opinion of Lewis.  Professor Levi had been Attorney 
General of the United States under President Ford, brought in to clean 
up shop after corruption was exposed in President Nixon’s Justice 
Department.  Levi also authored a widely read book, An Introduction to 
Legal Reasoning, and taught a course at the University of Chicago 
called “Elements of the Law,” which focused on issues related to the 
role of precedent and the judiciary’s proper role in our legal system.   
I approached Professor Levi and asked him his opinion of Lewis.  His 
response was to ask me to write the question out and provide supporting 
materials—i.e., the opinions in the cases.  I did so and a few weeks later 
I received a four-page, single-spaced typed letter in reply with 
numerous citations to cases and quotations from opinions, all pointing 
to the conclusion that the Illinois Supreme Court improperly applied  
the rule of stare decisis in Lewis.40  I provided a copy of Professor 
 
37. See Lewis v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1446, 1455 (7th Cir. 1987); People v. Lewis, 547 N.E.2d 599, 
602–03 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989). 
38. See Lewis, 547 N.E.2d at 601. 
39. People v. Lewis, 430 N.E.2d 1346, 1373–74 (Ill. 1981) (Simon, J., dissenting). 
40. It may raise an eyebrow that a Justice was discussing this issue with me since I was not a 
member of the court’s staff.  The discussion was not in the context of any particular case pending 
or likely to come before the court, but was rather of the general sort of discussion of legal theory 
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Levi’s letter to Justice Simon.  He later told me that he showed it to his 
colleagues on the Illinois Supreme Court and informed them that he was 
going to print it as an appendix to his next dissenting opinion on the 
constitutionality of the Illinois death penalty.  He reported to me that 
their reaction to this proposal was that “Edward Levi is not a member of 
this Court.”  My recollection is that this episode got back to Edward 
Levi and he was not particularly happy about being dragged into the 
middle of the dispute.  I recall uncomfortably apologizing to Professor 
Levi for not having sought his permission before providing Justice 
Simon with a copy of the letter addressed to me. 
 
*** 
Justice Simon continued to dissent in every case in which the death 
penalty was approved in Illinois, always on the same ground: the 
prosecutor’s discretion was contrary to the Illinois Constitution’s 
separation of powers requirement.  Further, he would often seize on 
other procedural issues presented in a death penalty case to argue 
against imposition of the death penalty in the particular case.  He never 
expressed the view that capital punishment was wrong in principle as 
cruel and unusual punishment or contrary to human dignity.  In the 
main, Justice Simon pressed two themes: (1) The state’s death penalty 
statute” is unconstitutional because it “allows prosecutors too much 
discretion in choosing whether to seek the death penalty and . . . this 
may result in arbitrary application of the statute”;41 and (2) “A person 
should not be put to death in order to perpetuate the doctrine of stare 
decisis.”42 
The prior dissenters must have received Justice Simon’s continued 
focus on stare decisis as a personal jab.  Justice Simon blamed them for 
wrongful executions—in essence, he accused his colleagues of being 
accessories to murder.  Years after leaving the Illinois Supreme Court, 
when Justice Simon again attacked his former colleagues for their stare 
decisis reasoning in Lewis, he ruefully observed that if the real reason 
they changed their votes was to allow for the execution of serial killer 
John Wayne Gacy, “Gacy has the distinction of taking the eleven other 
persons who were executed in Illinois before Governor Ryan declared a 
moratorium on executions to death with him as well as the [thirty-three] 
young men he murdered.”43 
 
that is common for judges to have with lawyers and academics. 
41. People v. Silagy, 461 N.E.2d 415, 433 (Ill. 1984) (Simon, J., dissenting). 
42. Id. at 434. 
43. See Simon, supra note 35. 
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An obvious question is whether Justice Simon’s opposition to the 
death penalty was influenced by his Jewish identity, either directly as 
the result of religious views or indirectly as part of the general liberal 
political orientation of Jews in the United States at the time.  It is 
impossible to say with any confidence whether Justice Simon’s 
religious beliefs or membership in the Jewish community influenced his 
views on the death penalty.  The Reform Movement in the United States 
opposed the death penalty beginning in at least 1959 when its governing 
body issued the follow statement:  
We believe that there is no crime for which the taking of human life 
by society is justified and we call upon our congregations and all who 
cherish God’s mercy and love to join in efforts to eliminate this 
practice which lies as a stain upon civilization and our religious 
conscience.44   
One person familiar with Justice Simon stated that “his views on the 
death penalty were guided by the Jewish conception of value of each 
human life and the possibility of redemption.”45 
One thing is clear: Justice Simon’s opposition to the death penalty 
was consistent with his overarching commitment to integrity in law, in 
politics, and in the way he related to people and their problems.  
Reading Justice Simon’s opinions, it is clear that he always viewed 
them as resolving disputes concerning real people and their lives, not as 
primarily involving abstract principles of law.  His background in local 
politics and in solving constituents’ problems was clearly an influence 
on his view of the role of a judge.  In Justice Simon’s view, if the legal 
system was not working properly, it certainly should not be allowed to 
decide matters of life and death. 
B. The Case of Ed Loss 
Justice Simon’s constant tension with his colleagues culminated in a 
decision concerning the application to practice law of a law school 
graduate named Ed Loss.46  Loss graduated from DePaul University 
College of Law in 1983.  One year later, he applied for membership in 
the Illinois Bar.  Bar membership involves two issues: qualifications 
 
44. This resolution was issued by the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, a Reform 
umbrella organization.  The full text of the 1959 resolution is available at http://www.reform 
judaismmag.net/02summer/focus.shtml.  This opposition continues to the present day.  See The 
Jewish Perspective: Death Penalty through a Jewish Lens, RELIGIOUS ACTION CTR. OF REFORM 
JUDAISM, http://rac.org/Articles/index.cfm?id=1665&pge_prg_id=8089&pge_id=2396 (last 
visited Mar. 28, 2013). 
45. Telephone Interview with John Simon, supra note 11. 
46. In re Loss, 518 N.E.2d 981 (Ill. 1987), appeal dismissed Loss v. Supreme Court of Ill., 
484 U.S. 999 (1988). 
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and character and fitness.  Loss met the standards in terms of 
qualifications, which essentially require graduation from an accredited 
law school and a passing score on the state bar examination.  Loss ran 
into trouble, however, in the character and fitness aspect of bar 
membership.  Because of doubts about Loss’s character, the state bar 
referred his application to a committee, which then referred the matter 
to a second, larger committee that voted in favor of admission (by a 
narrow 14-13 vote). 
Rather than simply admitting Loss to the Illinois Bar (as was the 
usual practice after committee certification), the Illinois Supreme Court 
issued an order requiring Loss to file a petition with the Supreme Court 
for admission to address the issue of his character and fitness to practice 
law.  As the opinions in the case reveal, this was the first time the 
Supreme Court of Illinois had requested such a petition after committee 
approval.47  The Illinois Supreme Court essentially placed the burden 
on Loss to show by clear and convincing evidence that he had been 
rehabilitated and was fit to practice law.48  The court found against 
Loss, concluding that “the evidence does not support the finding that 
petitioner is presently of good character and sufficiently rehabilitated to 
be admitted to the practice of law.”49   
The record contains abundant evidence of Loss’s poor character and 
fitness.  The court’s opinion explained: 
[Loss] was involved in juvenile delinquencies, criminal activity, and 
drug and alcohol addiction.  While a student at high school, petitioner 
was suspended on approximately 23 occasions, and on his first job 
was discharged for stealing money from vending machines.  He was 
charged with robbery and, as an alternative to conviction, was given 
an opportunity to enter military service.  He enlisted in the Marine 
Corps.  While in the Marine Corps, he was absent without leave for a 
period of 71 days and ultimately was given an undesirable discharge.  
Petitioner was also arrested and convicted on charges of disorderly 
conduct (for stealing money), selling marijuana, and possession of 
heroin, cocaine and marijuana.  The record is not clear as to the 
number of convictions.  He used various aliases.  In 1975, petitioner 
was arrested for possession of marijuana, selling heroin, and for theft 
from a gasoline station.50 
It also appears that Loss’s bar application, in contrast to his law 
 
47. Id. at 987–88. 
48. Id. at 984. 
49. Id. at 985.  The Court did leave open the possibility that it would reconsider its decision on 
a later re-application by Loss.  Id. at 986. 
50. Id. at 982. 
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school application, “candidly reveal[ed] facts and details about his 
background, including arrests and convictions not previously noted.  
During his law school years he was an excellent student, started a 
business by means of which he supported his family, and aided and 
befriended many of his fellow students.”51 
The court’s opinion does not specify what facts it found persuasive in 
denying Loss a license to practice law.  After reciting facts both in favor 
and opposing Loss’s claim of rehabilitation, the opinion simply 
concluded that the evidence did not support a showing of “good 
character and [sufficient rehabilitation] to be admitted to practice law in 
Illinois.”52 
Justice Simon vehemently dissented from the court’s decision to 
reject Loss’s bar application on two grounds: (1) The Illinois Supreme 
Court did not have the power to overturn the Committee on Character 
and Fitness’s determination regarding Loss’s fitness to practice law, and 
(2) The Illinois Supreme Court had violated basic procedural norms, 
including reliance on off-the-record communications.53 
Justice Simon began his dissent by quoting the Supreme Court’s rule 
that, at the time of Loss’s application, stated: “‘If the committee is of 
the opinion that the applicant is of good moral character and general 
fitness to practice law, it shall so certify to the Board of Law Examiners 
and the applicant shall thereafter be entitled to admission to the bar.’”54  
The majority concluded, however, that the power to review the 
committee’s decision rested in its duty to protect the public from 
incompetent and dishonest attorneys.  In the majority’s view, any other 
reading of the court’s rules would be absurd.55 
Justice Simon responded that the court had violated Loss’s due 
process rights.  More specifically, Justice Simon claimed that 
[d]ue process demands that we follow our own rules while they 
remain in force, and they are binding on this court the same as on 
 
51. Id. at 983. 
52. Id. at 985. 
53. Id. at 985–86 (Simon, J. dissenting). 
54. Id. at 995 (quoting 107 Ill. 2d R. 708(c)). 
55. See id. at 984 (majority opinion) (“A rule, like a statute, must be construed to avoid an 
absurd or unconstitutional result. Were we to construe Rule 708(c) in the manner urged by 
petitioner we would face the absurd situation that, confronted with the record here, we were 
powerless to consider the correctness of the decision to certify and would be required to blindly 
admit petitioner.  This does not comport with our duty to protect the People against incompetency 
and dishonesty on the part of members of the bar. . . .  To read literally the language of the rule 
would divest this court of jurisdiction to review the finding of the committee and thereafter deny 
admission, resulting in an unconstitutional delegation of our jurisdiction and an abdication of our 
duty to regulate the bar of this State.” (internal citation omitted)). 
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litigants.  It is no answer to say that Mr. Loss has been afforded a 
hearing, for the ad hoc proceeding ordered by this court was itself 
fundamentally unfair.  In their expressed desire to avoid an absurd and 
unconstitutional result, my colleagues have wrought just that.56 
Justice Simon’s other major issue involved the open question of how 
the merits of Loss’s application came before the court.  Justice Simon 
emphasized that the court, before Loss, had never reviewed a grant of 
certification by the committee because, as noted above, the Illinois 
Supreme Court rules make bar admission automatic upon a favorable 
committee decision.57  Thus, Justice Simon noted, the court had never 
“developed an appropriate standard for reviewing the committee’s 
findings.”58  Justice Simon further noted that that the Court’s order 
requiring Loss to petition the Court for admission to the bar was issued 
without explanation and “failed to advise Loss of how this matter even 
came before us.”59  Justice Simon elaborated on this problem, moving 
toward an explosive allegation of misconduct by his colleagues: 
Nothing in the record indicates the source of the information which 
triggered this extraordinary proceeding.  Such review has not taken 
place—in even a single instance—since I have been a member of this 
court.  Moreover, as the majority concedes, there are no formal 
procedures for keeping the court apprised of an applicant’s interaction 
with the Committee on Character and Fitness.  The only way this court 
could have been advised of Loss’[s] situation, therefore, was through 
an informal communication.  The possibility that this unusual 
proceeding was initiated on the basis of rumors or gossip turns the 
entire admission process into a sham.  It appears that those who can 
grab the court’s ear and are displeased with an applicant can trigger an 
additional inquiry, by this court itself, into the applicant’s moral 
character.  To adequately address the question of his good character 
and fitness Loss has a right to know how and why his application was 
singled out for such special attention.60 
This passage contains two criticisms of the court’s action.  The 
milder critique is that the court did not sufficiently inform Loss of the 
basis for its concern so that Loss could prepare for the hearing.  The 
second criticism, which goes to the heart of the judicial process, is that 
the court’s decision to hold a hearing was based on “informal 
communication,” “rumors,” or “gossip.”  It would be completely 
inappropriate for the court to make its decision based on factors outside 
 
56. Id. at 996 (Simon, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted). 
57. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
58. Id. at 997. 
59. Id. at 996. 
60. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
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the record, certainly without allowing the parties to address the matters 
not reflected on the record. 
That Justice Simon was accusing the other justices of serious judicial 
misconduct was not lost on the court, the media, or the general public.  
Justice Ryan, who was a target of Justice Simon’s stare decisis missives 
regarding the death penalty, wrote a long concurring opinion in which 
he detailed the reasons why he found Loss unfit to practice law.  Justice 
Ryan thought that Loss continued to be dishonest and pointed out that 
Loss’s problem with alcohol continued during his time in law school.  
Justice Ryan also responded at length to Justice Simon’s charge of 
procedural impropriety: 
The author of the dissenting opinion has, inadvertently I hope, used 
innuendos, general accusations, and emotionally charged language, 
which were seized upon by segments of the media, expanded and used 
to create a cause celebre over a “reformed drug addict and petty thief” 
whom this court has refused to license to practice law.  I feel I must 
respond to the misleading and unfortunate statements by the author of 
the dissent, which have caused the media and the public to challenge 
the integrity of those who joined in the majority opinion.61 
After quoting the passage from Justice Simon’s dissent quoted above, 
Justice Ryan continued: 
I find [the dissent’s] language offensive because it implies that there 
was some clandestine, unethical, and possibly illegal communications 
from some unspecified person or persons to certain members of the 
court, which caused Loss’ application for admission to the bar to be 
“singled out for such special attention.”  Why was it necessary to 
resort to such damaging innuendos and general accusations?  Why was 
it necessary to invite the public to speculate as to what sinister activity 
had produced this result and the media to publicly imply that the “fix 
is in” on the court? . . .   
 If the following constituted “informal communication, or “rumors 
or gossip,” or grabbing “the court’s ear,” why did the author of the 
dissent not complain about it in the conference room, when the matters 
to which he now apparently alludes were openly discussed?62 
Justice Ryan then gave three reasons why it was proper for the 
Supreme Court to take up the matter.63  First, under the court’s rules 
and organization, the matters heard by the Committee on Character and 
Fitness are structurally open to scrutiny by the court.  Second, the 
Illinois Supreme Court itself is the final arbiter of any applicant’s fitness 
 
61. Id. at 986 (Ryan, J., concurring). 
62. Id. at 986–87 (internal citation omitted). 
63. Id. at 986–90. 
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to practice law.  Finally, Loss received due process by virtue of notice 
concerning what matters were of interest to the committee, the hearing 
before the committee, and the briefs and argument to the Illinois 
Supreme Court.  Justice Ryan denied that information had reached the 
court through any channel other than its connection to the established 
character and fitness committees.   
Justice Ryan then went into great detail about what he viewed as 
overwhelming evidence that Loss was not fit to practice law,64 
including dishonesty in his bar and law school applications and at least 
one bout with drunkenness during law school.  Justice Ryan also found 
it difficult to understand the public’s outrage over the court’s handling 
of the matter given that, at the time, the Cook County Circuit Court was 
under federal investigation for corruption and “the media and the public 
have soundly condemned the legal profession for harboring too many 
crooks and cheats.”65  To Justice Ryan, the charges of procedural 
impropriety would only further weaken the public’s confidence in the 
courts. 
Justice Simon would not have any of this.  To him, the court had 
invented a procedure to deny bar membership to an applicant who had 
met all of the preexisting substantive and procedural requirements in the 
rules.  Worse, Justice Simon believed that the court heard about Loss’s 
application through an ex parte contact.  Although he did not respond 
directly to Justice Ryan’s invocation of the scandal confronting the 
Cook County courts, presumably Justice Simon would have denied that 
violating their own rules and norms of judicial conduct would help 
restore the public’s confidence in the Illinois courts. 
After the Loss decision, any semblance of a normal, collegial 
relationship between Justice Simon and other members of the court, 
especially Justice Ryan, was completely gone.  Justice Simon was 
ostracized by his colleagues—even his involvement in the court’s 
administrative matters did not continue in a normal fashion.  At this 
point, Justice Simon’s feeling of comparative isolation as a judge must 
have been overwhelming.  He had no hope of persuading his colleagues 
to strike down the death penalty in Illinois and he could not have 
enjoyed the court’s tense environment.  In January 1988, only a few 
 
64. See id. at 990–95. 
65. Id. at 995.  This reference was to the Greylord scandal, which revealed that numerous state 
court judges in Cook County were accepting bribes.  The irony of Justice Ryan’s reference to this 
is that it was common knowledge in Chicago that this activity was ongoing.  In fact, one large law 
firm, since disbanded, was referred to in part as “Bagman.”  I knew about this as a law student in 
Chicago and I would thus have to believe that it was widely known in the legal establishment 
before the federal investigation took place. 
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months after the Loss decision, Justice Simon announced that he would 
resign effective February 15, 1988.  Although Justice Simon claimed 
that he was tired of spending sixteen weeks per year in the state capital, 
it seems more likely that he resigned either over the conduct of his 
colleagues or because of the effects of the tensions on the court. 
III. SEYMOUR SIMON: THE “OUTSIDER” 
A theme that often arises in considering the careers of Jewish judges 
(outside of Israel, of course) is that of being an outsider.  Although 
American society is relatively tolerant, Jews were and perhaps still are 
considered outside the mainstream Protestant culture.  Remarkably, 
today there are no Protestants on the present U.S. Supreme Court, but 
rather six Catholics and three Jews.   
Seymour Simon presents a puzzling example.  He worked within the 
political establishment to become a City Council member and County 
Board President.  The ethnic politics and residential segregation of 
Chicago made it inevitable that some Jews would succeed in politics; at 
the city level, however, the Irish establishment had a pretty firm grip on 
control, with Italian, Jewish, Polish, and black minorities tagging along.  
Interestingly, the Irish establishment was Catholic, which may have 
made them more open to the aspirations of non-Protestant ethnics.  The 
voices of blacks may have been somewhat suppressed relative to their 
numbers until the ascendancy of Harold Washington as the Chicago’s 
first black mayor in 1983. 
Jews were clearly outsiders in Chicago’s legal establishment during 
the time of Justice Simon’s political and judicial ascendancy.  Jewish 
lawyers were not hired by the large, established law firms (at least 
through the 1950s), and many found it necessary to establish their own 
firms.  During the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s, Jews 
were among the strongest supporters of rights and equality for blacks.  
In fact, many of the white civil rights lawyers who headed south to aid 
protesting blacks were Jewish.   
Despite this outsider status of Jews, it is difficult to place Justice 
Simon on an “insider-outsider” spectrum given the ethnic politics of 
Chicago and Justice Simon’s repeated electoral successes. Other 
contemporary Jews held powerful positions in Chicago and Cook 
County politics.  Justice Simon worked within the Democratic machine 
to gain election, and always used the traditional political method of 
casework and relationship networks to maintain his political position.  
At the County Board, he was chosen by the machine to fill a seat 
traditionally reserved for a Jew.  He was, however, unable to suppress 
his values and sacrifice his integrity, and thus assumed the role of the 
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outsider both as an opposition politician and judicial dissenter.  The 
status of Jews as outsiders may have made it more likely for Justice 
Simon to assume those roles than, for example, an Irish politician who 
would have a closer relationship and stronger self-identification with the 
political machine.  It is unlikely that a simple twist of fate led to the 
demise of Seymour Simon’s careers in public service and alienated him 
from party leadership and his colleagues on the Illinois Supreme Court.  
There seems to be some quiet, constant reminder of difference that 
cannot be suppressed. 
IV. EPILOGUE 
A. The Death Penalty 
Controversy over the death penalty in Illinois did not end with the 
departure of Seymour Simon from the State Supreme Court.  Slowly but 
surely, evidence mounted that the administration of the death penalty in 
Illinois was seriously flawed.  Convicts on death row began to be 
exonerated, first through testimony revealing schemes to implicate 
innocent persons and later through DNA evidence.  The story of the 
death penalty in Illinois had all of the ingredients of pulp fiction—
innocent defendants tortured into confessing, police aiding in capital 
prosecutions knowing the defendant was innocent, police fabricating 
confessions, crooked judges taking bribes in some cases and acting 
tough on crime in others,66 and DNA evidence establishing convicts’ 
innocence years after trial.  One of the exonerations occurred just forty-
eight hours before the scheduled execution.67  In 2006, Justice Karmier 
of the Illinois Supreme Court wrote: “To my knowledge, [eighteen] men 
were ultimately determined to have been wrongly convicted and 
sentenced to death.”68   
One of the most striking examples of abuse involving capital 
punishment in Illinois is the case of George Jones, an eighteen-year-old 
high school student charged with murder in 1981.  Jones was taken to 
the hospital room of a seven-year-old boy who survived the crime, and 
when the boy did not identify Jones, the police officers lied and said 
 
66. See Bracy v. Schomig, 286 F.3d 406, 419 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding insufficient evidence of 
compensatory bias to award defendant new trial, but vacating sentence of death on grounds that 
“it is a fair, if not inevitable, inference that Maloney used the death penalty hearing to deflect 
suspicion that might be aroused because of, say, his acquittal of another accused murderer who 
had bribed him”). 
67. See Rob Warden, On This Day . . . 30 Years of the Death Penalty, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 12, 
2003, § 2, at 1.  Rob Warden is Executive Director of the Center on Wrongful Convictions at 
Northwestern University School of Law in Chicago, Illinois. 
68. People v. Morris, 848 N.E.2d 1000, 1012 (Ill. 2006) (Karmier, J. dissenting). 
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that he had.69  Another Chicago police officer had discovered evidence 
that Jones was not the killer, but much to the officer’s dismay, the state 
filed murder charges and went forward with the case.   
At trial, the officer explained that the police kept two sets of files, 
one with inculpatory information that was turned over to the defense 
before trial, and one, denominated “street files,” with exculpatory 
information that was, contrary to law, not turned over to the defense.  
Incredibly, after the existence of two sets of files became public, the 
Police Department issued a notice that files under the department’s 
control should be preserved, which some detectives interpreted as 
instructions to treat their personal investigative notes (i.e., notes not 
“under the department’s control”) as their own personal property to 
dispose of as they saw fit.  Further, rather than receive a commendation 
as the federal court of appeals suggested, the officer who came forward 
with the exculpatory evidence in the Jones trial was disciplined and 
demoted for failing to inform prosecutors of his testimony. 
It took a series of federal court injunctions to convince the Chicago 
Police that they should preserve all of their investigative files, including 
notes that were still being destroyed after the Police Department’s initial 
notice.  In their application for injunctive relief, attorneys representing 
criminal defendants detailed instances in which exculpatory material 
had not been included in information provided to the defense.  Further, 
the existence of approximately 300 street files was revealed.  Although 
the district court entered a fairly comprehensive preliminary injunction 
governing the preservation and handling of investigatory material, the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Chicago ultimately overturned 
much of the injunction on standing grounds.70 
 In early 2000, amid the mounting number of exonerations, media 
coverage of hundreds of examples of prosecutorial misconduct in Cook 
County, and the unreliability of death penalty convictions throughout 
Illinois, Governor George Ryan declared a moratorium on executions.  
Ryan’s primary concern was that innocent people might be executed.  In 
2002, the Governor’s Commission on Capital Punishment issued a 
report that recommended substantial reforms in the practice of capital 
 
69. See Jones v. City of Chicago, No. 83 C 2430, 1987 WL 16611, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 
1987) (“Presumably the jury accepted Attorney Schmeidel’s testimony that no identification took 
place at the hospital.”) 
70. See Palmer v. City of Chicago, 755 F.2d 560, 579 (7th Cir. 1985) (limiting preliminary 
injunctive relief to those street files in existence at the time).  The court ultimately affirmed a jury 
civil rights damages award of $801,000 for Jones.  Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 988 
(7th Cir. 1988). 
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punishment.71  Throughout 2002, evidence continued to emerge of 
tainted confessions and false convictions for murder—some on death 
row.  In 2003, shortly before the end of his term and at the urging of 
many public interest groups, Governor Ryan commuted all death 
sentences in Illinois.72  Eight years later, the General Assembly passed a 
bill repealing Illinois’s capital punishment laws, which Governor Pat 
Quinn signed it into law in March 2011.73  
After thirty years, Justice Simon’s view of the administration of 
capital punishment in Illinois was vindicated.   
B. Ed Loss 
Ed Loss became a practicing attorney in Arizona, specializing in 
defense of driving under the influence cases, until his death in 2009.  He 
described his practice as limited to “the aggressive defense of the 
accused, impaired driver from Misdemeanor DUI cases to Vehicular 
Homicides in [Arizona].”74  Loss was also active in national 
organizations devoted to the defense of drunk driving cases.  In terms of 
professionalism and ethics, the website advertising his practice, which 
has been taken over by another attorney, proclaims (still in the present 
tense): “Ed is proud of his Martindale-Hubbell ‘AV’ rating which 
identifies him as an attorney of the highest professional expertise and 
ethical standards.”75 
CONCLUSION 
I thought it would be nice to conclude this Article on a lighter note, 
which also reveals something about Justice Simon’s character and 
personality.  After I graduated law school, I served as a law clerk at the 
United States Court of Appeals in Chicago.  I continued to live in the 
same building as Justice Simon, and we would sometimes take the bus 
or even walk the two miles downtown together.  Many people, 
sometimes dozens, would greet Justice Simon every day, and he seemed 
to know them all by name.  I once saw him shake three people’s hands 
 
71. COMM’N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION ON 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: GEORGE H. RYAN, GOVERNOR (Apr. 15, 2002). 
72. In December 2003, following a long investigation, former Governor Ryan was indicted on 
charges related to official corruption.  He was convicted in 2006 and sentenced to six and one-
half years in federal prison.  See United States v. Warner, 498 F.3d 666, 674 (7th Cir. 2007). 
73. Senate Bill 3539, repealing Illinois’s capital punishment laws, was passed by the Illinois 
legislature on January 11, 2011, and on March 9, 2011, Illinois Governor Pat Quinn signed it into 
law. 
74. Attorney Edward A. Loss III, KATHLEEN N. CAREY LAW OFFICES, PLC, http://www. 
azduiatty.com/arizona-dui-defense-law-firm.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2013). 
75. Id. 
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at once—one with each hand and one with an extended elbow. 
Sometime during this period, two friends of mine who were still in 
law school confided in me that they planned very soon to get married at 
Chicago City Hall.  They had reasons for keeping their marriage a 
secret.  I discouraged them from going to City Hall and promised to ask 
Justice Simon to perform the ceremony.  He readily agreed.  I was to be 
one of the witnesses so I met them at the courthouse (the Richard J. 
Daley Center) and brought them up to Justice Simon’s chambers.  
There, we were greeted by one of Justice Simon’s law clerks who 
happened to be a law school classmate of mine (we had her swear to 
secrecy).  Justice Simon greeted the couple warmly, and performed a 
beautiful ceremony, so beautiful that the bride and groom were crying 
and even I was a bit teary-eyed. 
I recounted this story recently to Justice Simon’s son.  I told him that 
Justice Simon ended the story by saying something about how he kissed 
the beautiful bride and then leaned over and kissed my friend.  Justice 
Simon’s son then reminded me of the whole story that Justice Simon 
told—a stock element in the numerous weddings he performed.76   
The story is that when he was an alderman, Justice Simon and his 
wife were traveling in France.  They arrived at a beautiful building in a 
small French town and, realizing it was the city hall, decided to go 
inside.  There, in an upstairs corridor, they observed a man in a fancy 
outfit performing wedding ceremonies one after the other.  The Simons 
watched for a while, and when the official took a break to have a 
cigarette between ceremonies, Justice Simon asked him if he was the 
mayor.  The man replied that the mayor was away and he was an 
alderman filling in.  Justice Simon identified himself as an alderman 
from Chicago and then asked him why there were so many weddings.  
He explained that in France, all couples must have a civil ceremony, 
which is usually followed by a religious ceremony.  Justice Simon then 
asked him why he kissed some of the brides at the end of the ceremony 
but not others.  Justice Simon reported that the alderman’s answer was 
that he kissed the beautiful ones—at which point Justice Simon would 
always lean over and kiss the bride in his ceremonies. 
As it was described to me, whenever Justice Simon performed a 
wedding ceremony, the warmth and love that he exhibited, in a sense, 
married or remarried every couple in the room.  Couples would move 
closer together, hold hands, and fight back the tears.  When it was first 
suggested to Seymour Simon relatively early in his political career that 
he might want to become a judge, Mayor Daley discouraged him, 
 
76. Telephone Interview with John Simon, supra note 11. 
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saying, “You’re an active fellow, you wouldn’t be happy there.”  
Perhaps performing wedding ceremonies was the closest Justice Simon 
had as a judge to those Ward Nights as Committeeman and Alderman 
when he would meet his constituents and do whatever he could to 
improve their lot in life. 
After resigning from the Illinois Supreme Court, Justice Simon spent 
the rest of his life in the private practice of law.  He remained active in 
numerous civic organizations, including Jewish groups.  In recognition 
of his contributions to law and justice in Illinois, the Jewish Judges 
Association of Illinois awards an annual Seymour Simon Justice Award.  
He was a judge and a man of the people, who was unwilling to 
compromise on matters of justice.  It is no accident, I believe, that his 
character and personality evoked the image of the great rabbi, the 
righteous Jew who was beloved and admired, and a little bit frightening 
at the same time. 
 
